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AN AMERICAN REFLECTION ON TURKEY'S FINANCIAL
LEASING INDUSTRY
CARL FELSENFELD*
An American observer of the banking scene finds Professor Tekinalp's
presentation remarkable. Although one might believe that leasing in
Turkey could not conceivably be of interest to an American lawyer, one
discovers that the subject casts an illuminating light on regulation of the
financial system.
Professor Tekinalp describes a highly controlled, newly established
system for financial leasing. Charters from the state are required; activi-
ties of lessors are prescribed; relationships among manufacturer, lessor,
and lessee are circumscribed; lease terms and amounts are limited; re-
ports must be submitted; and much more. At first blush, this all seems
somewhat reasonable. In the United States, we have a highly regulated
banking system. Indeed, many of the controls established in Turkey's
Law Concerning Financial Leasing are imposed by the United States on
banks. A commercial bank, for example, is restricted in its investment
banking activities, in its sale of insurance, and in its entry into the manu-
facturing sector. Moreover, although a holding company may operate
across state lines, a bank generally may not have interstate branches, and
the holding company is subject to restrictions under both federal and
state law.
But strangely, in the face of all this financial regulation, United States
financial leasing companies are essentially unregulated. If a leasing com-
pany in the United States wants to manufacture as well as lease equip-
ment, there are no prohibitions. If it wants to establish a branch office in
Tennessee, no laws interfere. And if it wants to open a pizza parlor on
the side, again no law or regulation is violated. Why is financial leasing
such a highly regulated activity in Turkey when in the United States it is
subject to the free market? This is an especially compelling question
given that the United States subjects a related industry-banking-to a
blanket of laws and regulations.
Professor Tekinalp provides an answer. The essential difference is the
place of financial leasing in the Turkish economy as contrasted with its
place in the United States. Turkey is trying to stimulate financial leasing
and is willing to make several accommodations to financial leasing com-
panies that it does not make for other businesses. For this reason, it must
define and delimit the field of leasing. By contrast, bank regulation in the
United States exists for another purpose-to ensure the safety of the
banks.
One must ask, however, how the system of highly controlled regula-
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tion will work in Turkey. There is currently considerable debate about
the extent to which the United States banks might be over-regulated and
whether market freedom would improve the health of what is increas-
ingly perceived as a marginal business. Many are asking whether regula-
tory concepts imposed in 1863 (when national banks were established),
or 1913 (when the Federal Reserve was formed), or 1933 (when the de-
pression led to extensive "corrective" legislation), or 1956 (when bank
holding companies were regulated) continue to make sense in the 1990s.
The United States experience has been that it is easier to enact a statute
then to repeal it. Regulations build bureaucracies who are unwilling to
lose their powers and who ultimately see themselves as significant spokes
in the economic wheel. Regulations also protect parties who will fight,
rather than lose, their protected status. In short, regulations acquire
lives of their own.
One looks with interest to Turkey down the road, when it will have
developed a vibrant and thriving financial leasing industry. Will it con-
tinue to require that financial leases be at least four years long in order to
protect the lessor, the lessee, the economy, or whatever? The United
States experience strongly indicates that there will be arguments both for
the demise and continuation of the regulatory scheme Turkey has forged.
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